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Age is one of the most important factors shaping our
lives and societies. As babies and children, we are
dependent on parents or caretakers. As we grow older,
we go to school and follow-up education, develop cogni-
tively and emotionally and become increasingly autono-
mous. Later in life, we may get jobs, start families and
take on responsibilities of all kind. At the end of our
lives, we may have become wiser, but we also usually
take a step back in our responsibilities as we retire and
our physical condition becomes weaker. Therefore,
many societal institutions and social arrangements are
focused on certain ages or stages in life, and this is also
reflected in law. In various legal areas, there are rules
and procedures that are applicable only to certain ages
as they are related to varying responsibilities, levels of
cognition or socio-emotional capacities to make and
understand decisions. Age plays a role in judicial deci-
sions regarding culpability or sanctions and regarding
qualification for certain services or rights. In accordance
with human rights conventions, there are even special
areas of law that are devoted to certain age groups, for
example juvenile justice for young offenders or care
proceedings in family law.
How age should matter in judicial decisions and at what
age the age limits should be set is a complicated issue. It
can be approached from different legal angles, including
arguments drawn from legal philosophy about responsi-
bility, autonomy, accountability, and protection. But
also empirical insights on how young people develop
into responsible and autonomous adults need to be taken
into account. These insights can be drawn from a wider
array of behavioural scientific disciplines, including
biology, developmental psychology and the neuroscien-
ces. For example, there is an ongoing discussion on the
judicial consequences of new insights from studies in
neuropsychology showing that brain development still
continues until the age of 25. Some scholars argue that
this needs to be taken into account in criminal justice
decision-making. At the same time, research in develop-
mental psychology shows that adolescents and also chil-
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dren seem to be more able to make balanced and reason-
able decisions about their own family situation, their
health and their identity than often assumed, which may
have important implications for their position in civil
law and voting procedures. The interplay between
empirical insights from behavioural science and legal
arguments means that the question of whether and how
age should matter in law is best served with a multidis-
ciplinary perspective.
Despite the progress in the behavioural sciences, it is
often difficult to determine the age at which individuals
have reached certain levels of cognition and responsibili-
ty that are needed to take autonomous decisions and the
age at which they can be held accountable for crimes
and be punished as adults. This may even differ from
person to person and between social categories or
between cultures. For this reason, there is a lot of space
for discussion. Age limits in law are seldomly uncontes-
ted: policymakers and legal scholars often disagree on
the age limits that suit the situation the best. As a result,
differences in age limits and other legal arrangements
related to age exist between countries and sometimes
between jurisdictions. Age limits also differ between
areas of law, such as criminal law, family law, civil law
and labour law.
In this special issue, we bring together seven articles
that deal with various age limits and age considerations
in several areas and disciplines: international law, youth
justice and criminal law, civil law and family law, voting
rules, European labour law and health law. Authors
from different countries were asked to write a contribu-
tion on age limits in legal areas and to include a discus-
sion based on a combination of normative arguments,
comparative analyses and empirical insights on human
development. This has resulted in a varied thematic
issue that starts with two overarching contributions.
The first one is that of Rap, Schmidt & Liefaard, which
reflects on the fundamental principles and practical
application of age limits in several legal areas, based on
international children’s rights law. The authors focus on
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNCRC), in which protection as well as participation
and autonomy are central issues. They observe an
inconsistent application of age limits and conclude that
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child struggles
to provide comprehensive guidance, resulting in open
norms and leeway to set age limits based on practical
and political reasons. The second overarching contribu-
tion is a comparative analysis of Leenknecht, Put &
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Veeckmans, in which age limits within the youth justice
systems of six different countries are analysed. These
include the Netherlands, Northern Ireland and New
Zealand, with a low minimum age of criminal responsi-
bility, and Belgium, Austria and Argentina, with a high
minimum age of criminal responsibility. The compari-
son shows that the systems of age limits are far more
complex than just lower and upper age limits and that
within the justice systems there are several other rele-
vant age limits, such as court age limits and detention
institution age limits. The authors end their contribu-
tion with a proposal for a coherent conceptual frame-
work on age limits in youth justice.
The next two contributions focus on current develop-
ments and discussions on legal age limits in the Nether-
lands. The contribution of Bruning and Peper shows
that in Dutch family (civil) law, there is a tortuous jun-
gle of age limits, exceptions and limitations regarding
children’s procedural rights. The authors focus on the
lower legal age limit for the right of children to be heard
according to Article 12 UNCRC and argue that the cur-
rent age of 12 in Dutch civil law should at least be low-
ered to the age of eight. They suggest that based on
empirical research with a neuropsychological perspec-
tive, the best option would be to individually determine
the child’s competency in each case. On the other hand,
they argue that fixed legal age limits have the advantage
of a clear system. Instead of organising a system for
individual assessments, a system in which the judge can
focus on inviting all children from a certain age to be
heard in court would be preferable. In a sense, the con-
tribution of Prop, Van der Laan, Barendregt & Van
Nieuwenhuizen evaluates a system in which an opposite
direction was chosen. In 2014 the Netherlands broad-
ened the possibility to impose a youth sanction on
offenders aged 18 to 22, for young offenders with
behavioural problems and developmental stages that
would fit juvenile justice better than adult criminal law.
But in this law the Dutch government opted for the
burden of an individual assessment in each case instead
of bringing all young adult offenders to the Youth
Court. The authors show that the young adult offenders
that were selected committed more offences of a serious
nature compared with young adults sentenced with
adult sanctions and that the nature of the problems of
this selected group was in line with what was intended
by this proceeding. However, it is unclear to what
extent they were also less developed mentally. The
authors observe that the concept of maturity remains
elusive and difficult to assess in legal practice and call
for more research in this regard.
The last three contributions refer to age limits in three
totally different legal areas. Peto addresses the issue of
the minimum age for the right to vote and extensively
addresses insights from empirical developmental psy-
chology to show that by the age of 16 (if not earlier)
individuals have developed all the cognitive components
of autonomy, although various other capacities are still
evolving. Respect for autonomy requires granting politi-
cal rights, including the right to vote for this age group.
Ter Haar provides a complete overview of how the
European Court of Justice (CJEU) has handled age
discrimination regarding employment and labour law.
Her qualitative analysis shows that the CJEU seems to
follow a ‘complete life view’ when judging these cases
and that an unequal distribution of resources over the
course of the life of an individual, or different ages, can
be acceptable. The last contribution of Horton is on age
limits in healthcare in the United Kingdom, where the
National Health Service determines access to a range of
health interventions, including infertility services and
cancer screening and treatment. The article explores the
compatibility of some of the age barriers with UK anti-
discrimination law, which has prohibited age discrimi-
nation in the provision of public services, including
healthcare. Age considerations in care have become even
more pressing since the Covid-19 crisis has affected
particularly older people and has put pressure on the
available health resources.
All in all, this issue shows how insights derived from
non-legal disciplines like philosophy and developmental
(neuro-) psychology are used to determine legal age lim-
its. At the same time, it also illustrates that even if those
insights are clear (which is not always the case), setting
legal age limits is still a very complicated process.
One complicating factor is that the way in which age
limits in legal systems are set differs from system to
system, with far-reaching consequences in practice.
Youth justice provides a telling example of this (as
illustrated by the contribution by Leenknecht et al. in
this issue). When the age limit for being tried as an adult
is set at 18, it is still a question whether the system starts
from the age at the date of the trial or at the date of the
offence. That makes a big difference because it can
sometimes take a year or longer before the trial takes
place. Most systems use the date of the offence – but
then the problem remains that committing a crime one
day before the 18th birthday leads to completely differ-
ent sanctions than one day later: a more education-
focused youth sanction or an adult sanction with the
possibility of life imprisonment. This is one of the
reasons why some systems (including the one from the
Netherlands; see also the contribution by Prop et al.)
created the possibility for ages 18-21 to qualify for youth
sanctions and for ages 16-18 to qualify for adult sanc-
tions. These exceptions clearly illustrate that the legisla-
ture should not follow rigid age limits, whether based on
insights from behavioural science or not, but always
respect the human rights perspective and legal princi-
ples. With regard to this, it is noteworthy that the first
exception (18-21 years old tried as juveniles) is in
accordance with the UNCRC but that the second
exception (16- and 17 years old tried as adults) is not.
Another example of the complex relationship between
insights from behavioural science and legal age limits is
that a balance is needed between clarity and predictabili-
ty, on the one hand, and a tailored approach, on the
other. From a (neuro-)psychological perspective the
best option would be to individually determine the ado-
lescent’s or child’s competency in each case because the
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psychological and neurological development differs
from person to person. But from the juridical principle
of legality, legal age limits should be clear in the law,
and defendants should not be dependent on assessments
by a psychologist to be brought to court. This would
mean that in youth justice or in family law, it might be
better if all children from a young age are heard in court
and if all young adult offenders are brought to the
Youth Court so that they get a fair chance with a judge
who eventually takes the decisions that affect their lives
instead of a behavioural scientist.
A last example of the complexity of the subject of this
special issue is the apparent contradiction between dif-
ferent legal areas in the consequences of insights from
behavioural sciences. In this issue, arguments based on
developmental and cognitive psychology and the neuro-
sciences lead to a plea to lower the age to vote to 16 and
the age to be heard in court even to 8. At the same time,
findings from the behavioural sciences are used to argue
that it is necessary to raise the age to qualify for a youth
sanction to 23.
However, from a human rights perspective, there is no
contradiction. All arguments raised in this issue relate to
the extension of rights: the right to vote, the right to be
heard and the right to qualify for a youth sanction. In
the end, then, setting the right age limits seems to be a
matter of combining empirical insights from the behav-
ioural sciences with applying recommendations based
on human rights.
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